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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
GLEKK REYNOLDS, 
Plai-ntiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
A~IERIC ... \N ~~OUNDRY AND 1\IA-
C_liiNE CO~fP ANY, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
N_<). 7697 
BRIEF 0~-, DEF,END.A.NT AKD APPELL~NT, 
AJ\IERICAN ~~OUNDRY AND ~lACHINE CO. 
STATE~1ENT OF FAC-TS 
Plaintiff is an employee of Clarence W. Silver Com-
pany. Clarence W. Silver Company, as an independent 
contractor, on Dece1nber 28, 1948, was doing work under 
contract for the defendant company in· the repair of a 
transformer. Plaintiff sued defendant for defendant's 
claimed negligence. The jury awarded plaintiff a judg-
Inent of $5,000.00 for special and general damages suf-
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fered as a result of an injury to the right hand of plain-
tiff, \vhich injury occurred when a link in a chain block 
separated, dropping the load being· lowered by the chain 
block. 
The facts of the case are as follo-w's : In 1937 the 
defendant corporation purchased and placed in operation 
a transfor1ner, the core of which weighed six tons and 
was encased in a meta:l tank approximately twelve feet 
high, three fee~ in width and four and one-half feet in 
length. Clarence W. Silver, an electrical contractor, did 
the work of installing and placing the transfor1ner in 
operation. At the time the transfor1ner was purchased 
Clarence -,,~. Silver reco1nmended and subsequently di-
rected the installation of a large I bearn over the roof 
of the building encasing the transforrner to be used as 
the support on which the chain block could be put for the 
purpose of raising and lowering the transforrner core 
when repairs were needed. At the sa1ne tirne Clarence 
Silver directed the defendant eornpany to purchase a six-
ton chain block. (R. 121-122) 
In 1937 the chain block "\\~as purchased new, and Sil-
ver was called to check the chain block by the manager 
of the defendant company. Silver inspected the chain 
block in the pattern shop, it having been just taken from 
the shipping package, and was "all kind of tied around 
so as to make a close package in shipping." (R. 132) At 
that time the chain black had its rated capacity strunped 
upon at as "six tons", and conformed to the specifications 
given by Silver. (R. 128) Silver then directed the boxing 
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of the chain block, and placed tlte chain block in the box 
in the trru1sformer roon1. (R. 122-123) 
In the first part of Dece1nber, 1948, the transformer 
failed and Clarence SilYer 'vas called in to handle the 
repair. The core 'vas taken fron1 the tank by a crane, 
repaired and placed back in the tank and placed in oper-
ation. 
Within a few days the transfor1ner again failed and 
the crane "~as called in and the core removed. ·At that 
tune it becan1e evident tl1at the repairs would cover a 
considerable period, and Silver directed that they use the 
chain bloc.k. (R." 140) .. A.t this tilne S-ilver knew that the 
chain b'lock 'vas being used for the first time since its 
purchase. (R·. 140) The chain block was placed in posi-
tion under the direction of Silver and the hand chain 
operated in accordance "\viththe usual test made by Silver 
to see that the chain block "'"as in functiortable condition. 
The core was lo"Tered by the crane on to the floor of the 
transfor1ner building, and· on th~ second day of the break-
down the chain block was used to raise the core and lowe-r 
it back into a pan 'vhich had been prepared for that 
purpose. (R. 147) The core "\Yas then divided and the 
upper section, "~eighing approxin1ately two tons, was 
raised up through the roof and held while repairs were 
1nade on the lo\ver part of the transformer. (R. 148) 
Upon the core being repaired and assembled, the chain 
block was used to rai~e the entire six-ton weight of the 
eore and hold it susp·ended whi!le tests and infra-red 
treahnent 'vere given to it. (R. 150) 
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Approxirnately two weeks subsequent to the last 
brea:Kdown the transformer had been repaired and_ action 
was proceeding by way of placing the transformer in the 
tank. The core had been raised with the chain block so 
that the botton1 of the core was a pproxin1ately fourteen 
feet above the floor of the transfor1ner bUilding. 
The tank had been wheeled into position under the 
core and the core was being lo,vered into the tank. Four 
1nen ·were placed by Silver at each of the corners of the 
tank and 'vere guiding the core into the tank. When the 
core had been lowered to a point 'vhere the botto1n of the 
core had reached a point three feet below the top of the 
tank, a link in the chain block separated and dropped the 
core, and the right hand of plaintiff was struck by the 
2 by 4's placed to aid in the assembling of the unit. 
(R. 155) 
Plaintiff was taken to a doctor, where he receiYed 
1nedical care. He lost approxin1ately six weeks' work 
because of the injury. He sub1nitted his clain1 to the 
Industrial Co1n1nission and was a\\-arded co1npensation 
in the an1ount of $1607.35. Son1etime subsequent to that 
award this action was co1nmenced. 
There was no question of negligence involved in the 
operation of the chain block; in fact, SilYer testified: 
"Q. It came down just as evenly as you could 
possibly want it, isn't that correct 1 
"~\_. Well, the one thing that we 'vere happy 
about in lo,vering it on this w·as that \YhPn 've had 
lo,vered it previously 'vith ~Ietto1ne, "~ith his hoist 
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he 'vould drop it about three inches at a thne and 
the one purpose of putting this up 'vas so we 
could let it do'vn easy and slow . 
.. Q. And that 'vas "~hat was happening; it 
'vas coining down easyt 
"A. ,~ ery, very easy. We were just letting 
it dow·n an inch at a tin1e. 
"Q. ...\.nd there 'vas no jerking of the chain 
by those lo"'"ering the hoist 1 
"A. No. 
'•Q. They handled it properly in eveTy way, 
in the 1naneuvering of the hand chain and lo,ver-
ing itt 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And "-hen this core dropped was there 
any previous \Varning of any kind. 
" .. .:\.. No 'varning at all. It was a matter of 
split seconds. There \vas a big noise and that was 
the end of it." (R. 155) 
The chain block was n1anufactured by the McColloum 
IIoist and Chain Co1npany, a natiqnally advertised coln-
pany whose products are kno,vn under the trade-name 
as indicated; it being a product known in the same sense 
in the industry as Yale & To"'~ne, Reading and Chisholn1. 
(R. 301, 302, 350, 351) A destructive tesfwas made on 
the separated link, disclosing that the link had not been 
annea~led, and apparently it \Vas the only link in the chain 
block which had not received that treatment. (R. 175) 
"\Vhether a link has been anneale:d or not can be deter-
Inined only by a destructive test. (R. 175-178) This test 
.7 
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consists of cutting the link into sections, treating the 
exposed surfaces and subjecting the surfaces to micro-
scopic exainination. 
The evidence of the experts is uncontroverted on 
the use of chains and customs in industry to the effect 
that the rating, ca1)acity and performance· of an assem-
bled Inachine such as a chain block is accepted in. indus-
try, and tests for performance, capacity and inspection 
for satisfactory lnanufacture are not made before placing 
the 1nachine in operation. Plaintiff's evidenc-e was, and 
plaintiff's own experts testified without exce·ption, that 
no test \\"as ever 1nade before the use of a chain block 
'vith manufacturer's rated capacity, and plaintiff's ex-
pert~ further testified that it 'vas the practice to and in 
t1very instance they did rely upon the manufacturer's 
rated capacity. 
An1ong plaintiff's witnesses were Clarence W. Silver, 
''who grewr up "~ith chain blocks" (R. 129); Niels Chris-
tensen, 1netallurgist for Co1nbined 1fetals Reduction 
Co1npany ( R.. 198), 'rho stated, "Well, if the con1pany 
is ~ reliable con1pany you can accept the safe working 
load as the rated load." At Page 206 of the record, 
Christensen states that he had never been called upon 
to make a test of a chain block for his con1pany, though 
the testing "\Vas the duty assigned to him by that conl-
pany, and further states that it is the practiee and custom 
for the industry and for his comp·any to rely upon the 
rating of the 1nanufacturer, and that no test is made to 
check the perfor1nance or capacity; further, that the 
8-
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reason thi8 i~ not done is becauHe the 1nanufncture of 
the entire unit of the bloek and chain provides the source 
\Vhere all Ya.rious test~ neeording to the National s.afety 
Couneil are 1nade for perforn1ance and specifications. 
(R. 207) 
Further support of this custon1 appears in the testi-
Inony of Harry L. Young of the Harry L. Young Rigging 
& Trucking Con1pany, and Fred Richeda of The Lang 
Con1pany, \\-ho testified that the 1nanufacturer's rating of 
eapacity and perfor1nance of an asse1nbled n1achine such 
as a block and chain is accepted in the industry, and 
tests of perfor1nance are not made before placing the 
1nachine in operation. (R. 178, 311) The on1ly testing 
these experts eould suggest to determine defects, par-
tieularly the latent defect in the link involved, would be 
a destructiYe test resulting in a complete loss of the nla-
chinery. (R .. 178, 311) 
The negligence specified by plaintiff appears at 
page 25 of the transcript, in Paragraph 6 of the An1ended 
Complaint, as follows: 
1. Inadequate, defective and negligent construction 
of the link by defendant or defendant's agent from whon1 
the block chain was obtained. 
2. Defendant's negligence in supplying a defective 
and inadequate chain block. 
3. Failure to inspect and test the chain for tensile 
~trength. 
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4. If a test was made, the_ test was inadequate and 
negligent. 
5. If an adequate test was n1ade, defendant knew 
of the defect and negligently and wantonly failed to 
notify plaintiff of. the peril. 
As to the performance and reliance to be placed by 
reason o.f perforntance on a block and chain, Fred Rich-
eda of The Lang Company, and trained expert of n1any 
years' experience, states at Page 311 of the record: 
"Well, after the load has once been taken on 
the chain block there is absolutely no reason to 
inspect the chain block, esp~cially if it is held 
overnight or t\vo weeks, the chaiq block has defin-
itely proved itself by taking the load and hold-
ing." 
As indicated above, the chain block on several occa-
sions had sustained and held the entire six-ton weight 
of the transfor1ner core without evidencing or revealing 
any defect. As· heretofore pointed out, the chain had 
operated perfectly over the t\vo-\veeks' period of its use 
and to the instant that the link failed. 
STATE~IENT OF POINTS RELIED uPON 
POINT NO. I. 
UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE 
THERE WAS NO DUTY ON THE DEFENDANT TO 
MAKE AN INSPECTION OF THIS CHAIN BLOCK 
AT ANY TIME. 
10 
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(a) The chain block having been p·urchased [1·o1n a 
reputable ·nH?nufacturer, it is preszuned that it ulas· Jnan-
ufacfured, asse1nbled, inspected and tested by experts 
be{o1·e it 1.vas ever placed upon the 1narket. 
(b) There is n-o standard of ca1·e in the evidence 
show·ing the necessity of i1tspection or testi.ng before a 
chain block is placed in use 1vhen it is purchased new 
front the 1na-nufactu-rer. 
(c) There is no standard or evidence of a.ny neces-
sity, practice or custo·m for an inspection of a c_ha.in block 
following a period of and type of use as in this case. 
POINT NO. II. 
ONE SUPPLYING.CHATTELS GRATUITOUSLY FOR 
THE USE OF ANOTHER HAS NO DUTY TO DIS-
COVER LATENT DEFECTS. 
POINT NO. III. 
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF NEGLIGENCE IN 
PURCHASING FROM THE MANUFACTURER THE 
BLOCK AND CHAIN IN THIS CASE, AND THE 
COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY THEY 
COULD CONSIDER TilE PERSON FROM WHOM 
THE CHAIN BLOCK \VAS PURCHASED AS NEG-
LIGENT. 
POINT NO. IV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING CHRISTEN-
SEN TO GIVE HIS OPINION AS TO WHETHER 
11 
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THE CHAIN BLOCK SHOULD HAVE BEEN IN-
SPECTED AFTER IT HAD BEEN IN USE FOR A 
PERIOD OF FORTY-EIGHT HOURS. 
POINT NO. V. 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE DE-
FENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS 7 AND 
9 AND 2, 3 AND 4. 
POINT NO. VI. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE DE-
FENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 1 
FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT AND IN FAILING TO 
GRANT DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
).lADE TO THE· COURT AT THE CONCLUSION OF 
PLAINTIFF'S CASE. 
POINT NO. VII. 
THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTRUCTIONS 
NOS. 4 AND 5. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT NO. I. 
UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE 
THERE WAS NO DUTY ON THE DEFENDANT TO 
MAKE AN INSPECTION OF THIS CHAIN BLOCK 
AT ANY TIME. 
(a) The chain block having been purchased from a 
reputable Jnanufacturer, it is presunted that it was ·ntnn-
ufachtred, asse1nbled, inspected -:and tested by experts 
before it was et·er placed upon the 1narket. 
12 
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The e~sential theory of liability upon \vhieh 
plaintiff originally predieated this aetion i~ that defend-
ant o'ved a duty to 1na.ke an inspeetion and test of the 
chain block prior to or at the titne it w·as tir~t used. 
This theory appears both in the original co1nplain t (Par-
agraph 6, R. 2) and the atnended cou1plaint (Paragraph 
6, R. 25-26). It affir1uatively appears, ho"Tever, front 
plaintiff's evidence tha.t a1nong per~ons and in industries 
using ne"· chain block~ there is a. practice and custoin 
to rely upon the rated capacity of the 1nanufacturer. No 
test is ever n1ade of a ne'v chain block 'vhen the Inanu-
facturer giYe~ it a rating. Tlris custom clearly appears 
fron1 all the testnnony of- the "T .itnesses in· the action, 
and there is no eYidence to the contrary. l\ir. Clarence 
,V. Silver testified as plaintiff'~ witness he "'grew up with 
chain blocks." ( R. 129) The chain block in question in 
this action 'va~ purchased under his general supervision 
and direction. He sa'v it 'vhen it arrived at the defend-
ant's place of business in 1937. At this time it had just 
been re1noved from the shipping package. With refer-
ence to the condition of the chain block at the time of 
its arrival and necessity for a test, ~Ir. Silver testified 
as follows: 
"'Q. You 'vere satisfied as to the chain by the 
rating that it bore from the manufacturer1 
"A. ~Iy experience 'vith chain blocks had 
been that when they ntarked a chain block for six 
ton or three ton you could carry without any 
danger six ton or three ton and they always were 
built with a safety factor in the chain block unit 
itself. 
13 
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"Q. Now this exanuning as a co1nplete unit 
fron1 the n1anufacturer, is it your custom, or is it 
the recognized practice to rely upon the manufac. 
turer's rating of that block~ 
"~1R. SMOOT : I will object to that as being 
inco1npetent, inunaterial and irrelevant, Your 
Honor. 
"TilE COURrr: The objection is overruled. 
"A. I would answer that in this way. That 
when you buy a chain block 'vhich you consider i~ 
a good make block n1y experience-! don't know 
\vhether it is a practice, I 'vould change the word-
ing on you-it has been my experience over 1ny 
lifetin1e that if you bought from a responsibl(· 
ehain block hoist con1pany that if the chain block 
\Vas 1narked six ton you could lift six ton and you 
never needed to 'vorry about it. 
"Q. There 'vas never need of any test. I .~et 
n1e speak of your experience. There \vas never 
any need of any test of any kind? You relied upon 
\Vhat the factory told you. It was-
"~fR. S~IOOT: I ,vnl object to that as being 
inco1npetent, Your Honor, as to whether or not 
he needed to rely on a test. 
''THE COlTR'l,: The objection "Till be over-
ruled. 
"A. It has been my experience, or n1y prac-
tice to take for granted that the 1nanufacturer 
would state on the block six ton and you could 
lift six ton without any danger." (R. 32) 
N eifs Christensen, a 1netallurgist of Co1nbined ~1etals 
Reduction Con1pany, whose duties consisted of supervis-
14 
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ing use of chains in ehain blocks in this cotupany states: 
(R. 198) "\Veil, if the cornpany is a reliable company, 
you can accept the safe "·orking load as the rated load." 
He further states (R. 206) tl1at he had never been called 
upon to Inake a test of a chain block for his company al-
though testing 'vas the duty assigned to hiln, and that 
the rea.son the test "~as not 1nade of all new chains was 
that the practice and custon1 in the industry and for his 
co1npany "'"'"as to rely upon the rating by the tnanufac-
turer. lie stated tl1at it is 'veil known in the industry 
that the 1nanufacturer has the equipment and testing 
devices, and n1akes the tests required pursuant to the 
recommendations of the National Safety Council both as 
to perfor1nance and specifications. (R. 207) To the same 
effect it is the testimony of Harry L. Young, of the 
Harry L. Young Rigging & Trucking Company, and 
Fred Richeda, of the Lang Con1pany. (R. 178, 311) 
As is pointed out hereafter in the brief, no question 
was raised in the pleadings as to the fact that the chain 
block was purchased from a reliable manufacturer. The 
only test that could be 1nade \\-'"ould result in a destruction 
of the chain itself. Certainly it would be unreasonable 
to require a test of this kind. The fact that it was 
purchased from a well known company implies that it 
was assetnbled, inspected and tested by experts. The 
rnanufacturer has all of the devices necessary to make 
proper testings. The fact that it was ordere:d and re-
ceived as a chain block with a six ton rated capacity jus-
tifies the be1lief by defendant and its employers that its 
15 
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perfor1nance and specifications would be adequate to the 
uses required of it. 
(b) There is no standard of care in the. evidence 
showing the necessity of inspection or testing before a 
chain block is placed in use when it is purchased new 
from the manufacturer. 
In the case of Dunagan: v. Appalachian Power Co., 
33 Fed. ( 2d) 87 6, ( 4 CCA), a1nong the points raised in 
that case was the ()bjection of counsel for plaintiff to 
an instruction given by the Court for the reason that it 
is claimed the instruction makes the custom of other 
con1panies the test of due care. The Court said: "There 
is another and even stronger reason ""rhy the instruction 
complained of cannot be held reversible error, even if 
we were to give it the construction for which plaintiff 
contends. There was no evidence upon which to base 
a contention that the exercise of due care in the 1natter 
of inspection r~quired anything in addition of "That 'vas 
shown to be custo1nary, and there was not even an allega-
tion that the defendant "'as negligent in n1atter of in-
spection. It is true that the test of due care is not 
custom or usage but what reasonable proof would require 
under the circun1stances, but as said by ~T udge Knapp, 
speaking for this Court in the caHe of /)outhern Railu~ay 
Co. v. Miller, 267 Fed. 376 ( 4 C·CA): 
"Evidence of custom is al"'ays competent and 
often highly persuasive, and in the absence of any 
evidence tending to sho"T that the custo1n follo,ved 
by others in the business did not involYe reason-
16 
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able care or of evidence upon 'vhich to base a 
conclusion that reasonable proof would have sug-
gested additional precaution, it should not be held 
for reversible error that the Court adopted what 
'va8 eusto1nary as the standard." 
Continuing on "itl1 their discussion as to the custom 
being the basis for care and a conclusive basis, the c·ourt 
statest in the Dunagan case: 
.. If there 'vas nothing upon which to base a 
conclusion that reasonable proofs required any-
thing 1nore than the customary inspection, plain-
tiff could not have been injured by an instruction 
tha.t defendant 'vas required to make that which 
was customary." 
In the case of Lowden v. Hanson, 134 F·ed. (2d) 348, 
the Court states: 
"The equipn1ent having be·en purchased from 
a reputable n1anufacturer, we are clear that the 
defendants could not be charged with negligence , _ 
I because of any structural or inherent defect which 1 
was not patent at the time of its installation. De-
fendant~ were warranted in assuming in the ab-
sence of any notice to the contrary, that the equip-
Inent was without structural defects, and it was 
not incumbent upon them to dismantle the appli-
ance and separate it into its various parts for the 
purpose of discovering possible defects. It was 
man,ufactured, as_sembled, inspected and tested by 
experts before it was e.ver placed on the market. 
This was implied frorn the fact that the manufac-
turer was a reputable one. While it was the duty 
of defendants to inspect this appliance, it is our 
view that in the absence of any evidence that it 
'vas not properly functioning, defendants were not 
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required to dismantle the appliance and sub-1n-it 
it to a ttn'icroscopic in,spection ·or the other scien-
tific 'tests suggestedr ·by one of the witnesses for 
the purpose of discovering possible structural de-
fects. The functioning of the S\\Titch did not indi-
cate any defect or break, nor did it give notice or 
warning of any deficiency. Under the undisputed 
evidence we are of the view that there was no 
negligence in failing to discover an alleged struc-
tural defect nor in failing to dismantle and subject 
the instrumentality to a microscopic inspection, 
there being no evidence of a custom of submitting 
such appliances to such a test." . (emphasis sup-
plied) 
Further on in the opinion the Court states : 
"In McGivern, v. Northern Pacific R. Co., 132 
Fed. (2d) 213, we said: 'These instrmnentalities 
we-re in general use and n1et with general approval 
for the perfor1nance of this work. T'vo other 
carriers doing switching in ~finnesota were shown 
to follow exactly the same practice. While, custon1 
or usage may not be controlling as fixing the 
standard of care it 1nay be accepted "rhere the 
custo1n or practice is not in itself negligent or in 
disregard of the safety of the employee.' In 
C'anadian Northern R. Co. v. Senske, supra, the 
late Judge Walter H. Sanborn, speaking for this 
court, a1nong other things said (201 F. 643): 'The 
degree of care co1n1uonly exercised by other per-
sons -engaged in the san1e kind of business under 
similar circumstances presents such a standard. 
* * * the best test of actionable negligence and 
the true standard for the 1neasurement of ordin-
ary care is the degree of care which persons of 
ordinary intelligence and prudence, engaged in 
the san1e kind of business, con1monly exercise 
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under like circun1sta.nces. If the care exercised 
in the case rises to or above that standard, there 
is no actionable negligence.'" 
In G-rand T·runk R. R. Co. v. Ives, 144 U. S. 408, 
36 L. Ed. 485, the Supre1ne Court of the United States 
approved this charge : 
"You fLx the standard for reasonable, prudent, 
and cautious n1en under the circumstances of the 
case as you find them, according to your judgment 
and experience of what that class of men do under 
these circun1stances, and then test the conduct 
involved and try it by that standard." 
In Canadian Northern R. Co. v. Senske, 201 Fed. 637, 
t.he Court states: 
"These authorities, and a 1nultitude more, 
sustain the established rule that the standard of 
ordinary or reasonable care is that degree of care 
(1) which ordinarily prudent persons, (2) engaged 
in the sa1ne kind of business, ( 3) usually exercise 
under similar circumstances. It is plain that the 
care which extraordinarily cautious or unusually 
careless persons use would not be a correct stand-
ard. Nor would the care which prudent persons 
engaged in other kinds of business would use 
be the true standard. The care a farmer or mer-
chant would dee1n proper, in the absence of evi-
dence to guide him, and would use in running an 
engine, or building a bridge, would be no criterion 
of the ordinary care exercised by p-ersons clis-
tolnarily engaged in those occupations. Nor would 
the degree of care that prudent persons use or 
would use under different circumstances furnish a 
just crite_rion of ordinary care under the circum-
stances of a given case." 
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rrhe Court further states: 
"In the absence of proof to- the contrary, the 
. h * * * legal presmnption always 1s that eac com-
pany, its officers and ernployees, are faithfully 
discharging this duty." 
• * * 
"When the degree of care which the railroad 
cornpany actually exercised had been proved and 
the queHtion arose \vhether or not this was ordi-
nary or reasonable care, the legal presumption 
still prevailed that other railroad con1panies, their 
officers, and entplOiyees co1nmonly exercised or-
dinary care in making such inspections, and the 
uneon tradicted evidence of their customary Ineth-
od of 1uaking these inspections under like ~ircunl­
~tance~ necessarily established, in the absence of 
countervailing evidence, the true standard of or-
dinary care hy ,v·hich the inspection made by the 
defendant n1ust be n1easured." 
• * * 
''The validity of the general abstract rule 
that the 1neasure of care required of any e1nployer 
is that degree of care 'vhich an ordinarily prudent 
u1an, engaged in the same kind of business, 'vould 
have exercised under silnilar circumstances, is 
conceded." 
• • • 
''In cases * * * in which there is no proof of 
the degree of c.are "\\~hieh other ordinarily prudent 
persons engaged in the sa1ne kind of business 
commonly use, juries may measure the care re-
quired of a defendant by the application of this 
rule to other facts and circumstances in evidence 
before then1. But the best evidence of the degree 
of care "rhich ordinarily pTudent persons would 
have exercised under given circu1nstances is the 
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degree of care "~hich ordinarily prudent persons 
engaged in the san1e kind of business, custon1arily 
have exercised and ron11nonly do exercise under 
sin1ilar circmnstances. .A.nd, 'vhen the evidence of 
this degree of care is substantial or undisputed, it 
furnishes the true and the best standard of ordi-
nary care by which that actually used should be 
n1easured in all debatable cases. 
''What the true standard of ordinary care is 
in cases of this character is an exceedingly grave 
and important practical question to all employers 
and e1nployees. It is very important that this 
standard should be as fixed, certain, and well 
kno"\\11 as possible, so that eu1ployers can know be-
fore the events whether or not they are exercising 
the requisite care and faithfully discharging their 
duties. The degree of care commonly exercised 
by other persons engaged in the same kind of 
business under similar circumstances presents 
such a standard. The opinions and verdicts of 
juries, no two of which would probably agree, fix-
ing the standard by which to measure the em-
ployers' care after the events have happened, 
would necessarily be variant, uncertain, and spec-
ulative, and would furnish no reasonably certain 
standard of measurement whatever. 
"It is not denied that exceptional cases some-
tinles arise in which the degree of care exercised 
is so clearly insufficient, or so plainly ample, that 
the customary use of the same degree by others in 
like circu1nstances becomes immaterial. But the 
case at bar is not of that character. It is one of 
the great rnultitude of cases in which the suffici-
ency of the degree of care exercised by the defend-
ant was, in the absence of evidence, debatable., and 
in 'vhich its sufficiency must b~ measured by the 
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evidence in the case and rules of law applicable 
thereto. In such cases the best test of actionable 
negligence and the true standard for the Iueasure-
Inent of ordinary care is the degree of care which 
persons of ordinary intelligence and prudence, en-
gaged in the sa1ne kind of business, conunonly 
exercise under like circumstances. If the care 
exercised in the case rises to or above that stand-
ard, there is no actionable negligence. If it falls 
below that standard, there is. * * * 
"And where, as in this case, that degree of 
care is established by uncontradicted evidence, 
and the proof is C'lear that the care exercised bv 
the defendant rose above it, it is error to permit 
the jury to establish in their minds a higher 
standard of ordinary care after the accident, a 
:-;tandard unkno\vn, uncertain and speculative, and 
to cast the defendant in da1nages because the care 
it used did not reach that standard." 
In Lake v. ~~henango F·urnace. Co., 160 Fed. 887, at 
Page 895, the Court states : 
•'There are cases in which the act or omis-
sion at issue· is in itself so clearly negligent that 
the fact that other persons in th~ sa1ne or like 
circun1stances have been guilty of it is insufficient 
to modify its character or effect. * * * The defend-
ant's act or omission 'vas not of that character; 
and in such a case the true test of actionab]e 
negligence is the degree of eare which persons of 
ordinary intelligence and prudence comn1onl)~ ex-
ercise undeT the sa.1ne circu1nstances. If 1n .a 
given eaf-!e thelcare exercised rises to or above that 
standard, there is no actionable negligence; if it 
falls below it there is. Hence, in an action for 
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da1nages for negligence, evidence of the ordinary 
practice and of the uniforn1 custom, if any, of 
such persons in the performance under similar 
circumstances of acts like those which are alleged 
to have been negligently done is generally com-
petent evidence, for it presents to the jury the 
correct standard for their detern1ination of the 
issue whether or not the defendant was guilty as 
charged." 
We submit in this case that there be no evidence of 
any negligence or different standard in the custom or 
practice of using blocks and chains, and there was no 
need for any inspection of the new block and chain before 
placing it in use on this occasion by the Clarence W. 
Silver Company. 
The original position of plaintiff was that the defect 
in the chain was a latent one. The only test which would 
reveal its existence would be to cut out a section of each 
link and test it microscopically. The evidence produced 
relative to this defect is contained in the testimony of 
Don Rosenblatt and Christensen. 
"A. Well, our examination, our microscopic 
examination revealed that the particular link in 
question had not had any normalizing -heat treat-
ment, or annealed." 
''A. The. two links that were adjacent to the 
failed link showed that there had been an anneal-
ing treatment given to those particular links. 
* * • We only tested those particular links." 
"A. Well, the annealing treatment is sup-
posed to relieve stress and give the steel in ques-
, tion the maximum ductility.'' (R. 176) 
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"Q. An unnealed link would be 1nore brittle 
than an annealed link' 
"A. Yes, that is true." (R. 177) 
"Q. Now, in order, Mr. Rosenblatt, to test, 
and 1nake a test on every link in that chain to 
detertnine whether or not it had been annealed 
· 'vould you have had to go through this same pro-
cess1 
"A. Well, for every link you wanted to know 
about you would have to polish it and look at it. 
HQ. And that would Inean cutting out this 
Hection so that you could polish it and get it under 
the Inicroscope, is that correct 1 
"A. Yes. 
uQ. So you would have to destroy your en-
tire chain to find out if each link had been an-
nealed? 
HA. That's correct. (R. 178) 
"'Q. * * * could you look at this chain as it 
appeared on the chain block itself * * * and by 
looking at it tell 'vhether it had or had not been 
annealedf 
.. .A. No, I couldn't do that. (R. 180) 
''Q. * * * Can you tell froin the two surfaces, 
the rough surfaces on Exhibits 5 and 6, whether 
the section you cut out would be a part of the 
weld of that link? 
"'A. No, I coUldn't say 'vhether it is the weld 
or not." 
~'Q. Are you able to 1nake any deterinina-
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tion yourself as to 'rhether ti1e break did or did 
not occur in the 'veld~ 
H .A.. Not fro1n just looking at it, no. If we 
had all of the link. There are son1e pieces that 
are n1i~sing no"~. The thing could be edged, mi-
croedged, and the 'veld area 'vould stand out as 
a different color than the parent 1netal. That is 
a test that could be 1nade if it 'vas ilnportant to 
deter1nine 'vhether the fracture 'vas in the weld." 
(R. 182.) 
The follo,,ing is the te~titnony of the 'vitness Chris-
tensen: 
"Q. Do ~"ou have an opinion as to whether 
an unannealed link in the chain of the size and 
description of defendant's Exhibits 4 and 5 there, 
'\"hether such an unannealed link in such a chain 
would constitute a latent defect in that chain? 
'·A. Quite definitely I would say that an un-
annealed link 'vould be a 'veak link in the chain 
and would be a menace to its safe use." 
• • • 
"THE COURT: I think you asked in refer-
ence to a latent defect. You claim something, I 
guess, for the word 'latent' don't you' 
"MR. S:WIOOT: Yes. 
''THE COURT: I don't believe Mr. Chris-
tensen has answered in reference to that. 
"Q. Now would an unannealed link, the fact 
-let me put it this way-the fact that a link is 
unannealed be observable by a meTe inspection' 
"A. That is very doubtful. 
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"Q. And would there ever be an occasion, 
or would there ever he a situation under which 
you could observe and detect a link being un-
annealed merely by looking at it~ 
"A. I doubt it veTy much. 
"Q. Now, would a proof test of a chain be 
likely to reveal the presence of an unannealed 
link by breaking~ 
"A. A proof test would not reveal the un-
annealed link in a new chain, very probably." (R. 
199) 
"Q. Excuse me. Assuming a chain block 
was new in the year 1937-
"MR. BURTON: Bought new. 
"Q. Bought new and laid idly for a period 
of eleven years and some months, would that have 
had· any influence upon the steel in that~. 
"A. There might be very rninor changes, but 
I doubt if that would have much influence on it." 
An important and striking fact in the case at bar 
rs that this testimony with respect to the standard of 
care, that is the accepted standard in the industry con-
cerning whether an inspection was made of a new chain, 
was the only criteria of reasonableness before the jury. 
This testimony came fron1, a.nd was produced by plaintiff 
and his witnesses. It was corroborated by the witnesses of 
the defendant. There was nothing before the jury from 
which any conclusion could be ma~e, except that reason-
able men acting prudently in the industry, in which they 
are expert and qualified and with regard to their own 
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safety and the safety of the personnel 'vorking with 
then1, did not 1ua.ke a test for any inspection of ne'v chain 
blocks. 
'rhe defendant Con1pany is not in the position of an 
insurer. It is only bound to act and to exercise the care 
of an ordinary 1nan. The rule is stated in Section 388 
of tlze .. Jnz. La·zo Institute Restatentent of the Law of 
Torts, \:r ol. 2, p. 1039: 
•'One "Tho supplies directly or through a third 
person a chattel for another to use, is subject to 
liability to those 'vho1u the f-.:upplier should exp·ect 
to use the chattel, with the consent of the other, 
or to be in the vicinity of its probable use, for 
bodily ha.rn1 caused by the use of the chattel in 
the 1nanner for "Thich, and by a pe.rson for whose 
use it is supplied,- if the supplier 
(a) kno"'Ts, or fron1 facts known to him should 
realize, tha.t the chattel is or is likely to be 
dangerous for the use for which it is supplied; 
(b) and has no reason to believe that those for 
'vhose use the chattel is supplied will realize 
its dangeorus condition; and 
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform 
the1n of ib~ dangerous condition or of the facts 
which 1nake it likely to be so." · 
Defendant is not subject to the liability prescribed 
by this Rection. It did not fail to exercise reasonable 
eare to inforn1 plaintiff of the dangerous condition of the 
<~hain, or of facts ,v-hich 1nake it likely to be dangerous. 
Tt <lid not kno'v or have any facts to indicate to it that 
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the chattel was or was likely to be dangerous for the use 
for which it was supplied. It did not have any reason 
to believe that the plaintiff would not exercise the same 
precautions that defendant would exercise acting for its 
own safety in the use and exa1nination of the chain block. 
Defendant owed no duty to 1nake an inspection of the 
chain block, because it was not unreasonable for it, 
exercising the prudence of a reasonable person, to rely 
upon the manufacturer's rated capacity. The standard 
of care required of defendant in the circumstances pres-
ent in this case was the san1e standard which other sup-
pliers and users of chain blocks had in similar circum-
stances. All of the evidence in the case was to the effect 
that such persons, under such circu1nstances, do not make 
an inspection -or test of chain blocks. 
This is not a case where it can be said that defend-
ant owed a higher degree of care than is usually exercised 
by persons in the industry. The jury had before it only 
one standard of care and only one criteria for the deter-
mination of whether defendant acted as a reasonable per-
son. That criteria and th~t standard was, a.s herein-
before stated, to the effect that tests of chain blocks, sup-
plied by responsible manufacturers, are not made and 
need not be made. The jury could only properly infer, 
on the evidence before it, that defendant could not have 
been negligent in failing to 1nake an examination or test 
of the chain block in question. 
The Court connnitted no less than two errors in its 
instructions concerning the duty of the defendant in this 
regard. In Instruction No. 4 the Court sta.ted: 
28 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(R. -±1) '"You are instructed tl1at it was the 
duty of the defendant in this case to use reason-
. able care to deter1nine and ascertain whether or 
not the chain block in question was reasonably 
safe for the plaintiff and other workmen to use 
in the perfor1nance of the work in question. 
'rherefore, you are instructed that if you find by 
a preponderance of the evidence that the defend-
ant did not n1ake a reasonable inspection of the 
chain at any time prior to the happening of the 
accident, and that by such inspection the defect 
could have been ascertained and discovered, and 
if you further find that such failure.upon the part 
of the defendant, if you find that they did fail to 
u1ake ~uch inspection, was not such conduct as 
'volild have been perforn1ed by a reasonably pru-
dent person under the circumstances, and that the 
failure of defendant to n1aker such an inspection 
and the lack of discoYery of the defect, if any, in 
the chain inunediately before the happening of the 
accident, 'vas the proxin1ate cause of the breaking 
of the chain and the resulting accident and injury 
to the plaintiff, you 'vill then find the issues in 
favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant." 
In Instruction No. 5 the Court stated: 
( R. 42) '~In detern1ining whether or not de-
fendant acted as & reasonably prudent person, 
under the circuu1stances involved in this case, you 
may take into consideration the condition of the 
chain block at the time it was purchased, the .cir~ 
cun1stances as to whom it was bought from, the 
care and use it had received from the time it was 
purchased and until the time of the accident in 
question, its apparent mechanical and physical 
condition when put into use by defendant's em-
ployees, the rated capacity and the weight of the 
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transformer it was to be used to lift, the height 
and duration of the lift that was to be made, and 
the circumstances under which it was to be used, 
and fron1 these Inatters and all the evidence in the 
case, you are to determine whether or not the 
defendant's conduct 'vas ·such as would or would 
not be that of a reasonable prudent person, under 
the circumstances." 
The first error in these instructions is the implica-
tion that the jury could find from the evidence that de-
fendant was obligated to 1nake an inspection; that is, 
that there was before the jury a question as to whether 
the standard of care was higher or greater than the con-
duct "chich defendant ad1nittedly was a party to in the 
instant case. In other words, defendant did not make an 
inspection of the chain block prior to the tilne of its first 
use,- but neither did any other person under similar cir-
cuinstances. The instruction to the jury implied that 
they could find that there was such a duty upon defend-
ant. There was no evidence to support such an instruc-
tion. The Court obviously erred in this regar_d. No 
standard of care to require such a test or exan1ination 
was established. 
(c) There is no standard or evidence of any neces-
sity, practice or custom for an inspection of a chain block 
following a period of and type of use as in this case. 
As heretofore indicated, the . plaintiff changed his 
theory of liability in this case in the llliddle of the trial. 
In his pleadings (Paragraph 6 of the complaint and 
amended con1plaint, R. 2, 25-26) he stated that there was 
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a duty to n1a.ke an inspection and test of the chain block 
prior to the fir~t use. A::; the trial progressed it becan1e 
apparent that by reason of the standard of care estab"" 
lished in the industry itself, and the reliance on the man-
ufacturer's rating capacity, no duty could be established 
in this regard. Plaintiff "'"as unable to produce proof as 
heretofore stated that a standard of care required inspec-
tion and tests prior to the first use, so he shifted to the 
position that defendant owed to the plaintiff the duty to 
inspect and test the chain during the period of its use. 
It should be kept in n1ind that the chain block was used 
on the second day of the breakdown to raise the core and 
lower it back into a pan 'vhich had .been prepared for 
that purpose. (R. 147) Then the upper sectio~ ·of the 
core which 'vas approxirnately t".,.o tons in weight was 
raised up through the roof and held while ·repairs were 
being made on the lo-w·er part of the transformer. (R. 148) 
The chain block "~as used to rai:-;e the entire six ton 
weight of the core and held it suspended while tests and 
infra-red treatn1ent 'vere given to the core. (R. 150) 
This use had been for a period of several days prior to 
the tilne ''lhen the link separated. 
During all of the ti1ne plaintiff and other employees 
of the Clarence VV. Silver Co1npany were using the chain 
block with employees of the defendant company. Under 
the circumstances plaintiff now asserts the claim that 
defendant had an obligation to inspect the 'chain block 
during its use. 
Thi:s rhange of position "Tas asserted through the 
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. testi1nony of the witness Christensen. The record show·s 
at Page 219 that this witness 'vas excused, having conl-
pleted his original, direct and cross examination. The 
court then proceeded to hear the testilnony of the plain-
tiff himself .. Before direct exa1nination of the plaintiff 
was co1npleted the court recessed for the noon hour. 
(R. 231). On the sa1ne day of the trial Judge \Tan Cott 
called counsel for both sides into his office at 1:30 p~m. 
The judge asked Mr. Smoot if plaintiff's case was com-
pleted as fa.r as introducing evidence of negligence was 
concerned. Being assured that it was, the judge then 
told the plaintiff's counsel that unless theTe was further 
evidence to show an obligation by defendant to inspect 
the chain block, a non-suit would be granted. 
Thereupon the record shows (244) at the conlple-
tion of Reynold's testimony that ~ir. Smoot asked for a 
five-minute recess to talk to the 'vitness Christensen 
again, and at Page 245 nfr. Smoot 1nakes the staten1ent 
that he V\7ould like to ask leave of court to bring back 
Mr. Christensen because of the further investigation and 
inspection he had made of the evidence. These facts are 
called to the court's attention to show the court what 
occurred during the noon hour so that the court Inay 
properly appraise the testirnony of ~1:r. Christensen and 
to appraise the shift in position of plaintiff during the 
trial . 
.i_\_ t Page 252 of the record Christensen presents the 
follo,ving tef'tiinony: 
"Q. The testiluony concerning the difficulty 
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and the probabilities 'vhieh you have just now 
been called back to the stand about 'vas brought 
up and discu~sed as you got back into the Court 
here at 2:00 o'clock! 
·• A. That's correct. Yes, tl1at is what I said. 
"Q. And that was after your conversation 
then 'vith Mr. Smoot and lVIr. Wilkinson 1 
"A. No. I, they asked me to co~e back 
and n1ake a further examination of the link, which 
I did." 
The purport of Mr. Christensen's testimony, after 
being recalled to the stand, is to the effect that it was 
probable a crack had developed in this particular link 
prior to its ha,ing separated. When that occurred, Mr. 
Christensen did not know (R. 249); in fact, his state-
men t is this : 
"Q. Now inas1nuch a~ you have some opin-
ion on this can you tell me at which hour of the 
forty-eight this started to separate? 
"A. Not being God I wouldn't know, no. 
"Q. * * * At which point, as this core was 
being raised the last time, did it start to separate, 
if you know~ 
"Q. I don't know. 
"Q. You don't know that it separated during 
the time that it was hanging there for forty-eight 
hours1 
"A. I merely said that it was highly prob-
able, due to the nature of the material if it had 
a crack it 'vould become evident a considerable 
ti1ne before it broke." 
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At Page 247 of the record the Court per1nitted Chris-
tensen to te~tify over defenda:nt's objection in the follow-
ing respect : 
"Q. In your opinion, should this have been 
inspected after it had- been used for a. period of 
forty-eight hours, holding a weight- of six tons 1 
"A. Well, all I can say on that in view of 
the type of machinery it would certainly have 
been -the most wise precaution to examine it to 
determine if there was any defect before the final 
use." . +-
.P.,...,\ ....... 
Now, we ask the Court to contrast this testilnony 
w~th the testhnony which was given by Christensen in 
the 1norning on cross-exan1ination and at the conclusion 
of his cross-exrunination on Page 209 of the record: 
"Q. * * * assmning * * * a chain is bought 
new and then it is placed in a box built for that 
·purpose and it isn't used at all until on or about 
the 16th day of December, 1948. It is used for 
the fir:st tin1e and it is taken out of this box. 
Now at that time the rated capacity, the six ton 
load, is raised a~d lowered perhaps a foot or so 
while they put a pan unde-r the core of the trans-
former. With that much use the-re is no reason 
for any further check of the block .and chain at 
that time1 I mean any test; to take it down and 
1nake any further proof test after just raising and 
lowering the rated capacity of the block a.nd 
chain~ 
"A. Well if the rating, I 'vill say was cor-
rect, it ""'ould be natural to assume that the chain 
\vould support the six ton load, but-
"Q. Now-
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~' ~IR. SniOOT : Let hhn finish. 
··THE COlJRT: ,,~ell, I think perhaps he had 
finished and the otl1er V."'"asn't responsive. 
"Q. Mr. Christensen, after this block and 
ehain 'vas engaged in raising and lowering a six 
ton load there is no need to take the block down 
and go out and·Inake some test of it ~t that time, 
'vas there~ 
.. .L.\.. Under ordinary circumstances, no. 
~~Q. And in the p-rocess of repairing this 
transfonner over a- period of two weeks when 
perhaps a one-half ton load is moved in raising 
the top part of the transformer off, then as the 
lower part is repaired it is once again assembled, 
say ten days later, then this same six ton load is 
raised and held for forty hours while the , 
core is infra-red treated, there would be no ne;ed 
for any further proof testing between the period. 
of t'vo days and on the sa1ne job as an ordinary 
practice1 
"A. Not if you can accept the rating. That 
· is the big question. If you can accept the rating 
of it. 
"Q. Of the factory~ 
"A. Of the Inanufacturer." (R. 211) 
Fron1 the foregoing the "\vitness Christensen ha.s 
definitely established the fact that there was no reason 
for exrunining or testing the chain block after it had been 
delivered to Silver or after it had been used up to the 
tirne the link failed. 
We havt~ heretofore pointed out 1n Christensen's 
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testimony that the crack n1ay have developed for the 
first time on the last pull in raising the transfor1ner core, 
and once again we would like to point out the testi1uony 
on Page 249: 
"Q. You don't know that ~t separated during 
the time that it was hanging there for forty-eight 
hours1 
"A. I merely said that it was highly prob-
able, due to the nature of the material." 
It was on this testi:inony that Judge \Tan Cott re-
versed the position he had taken prior to the noon recess. 
and it 'vas on this testitnony that he per1nitted the jury 
to speculate as to whether a test and exa1nination should 
have been 1nade before the lift 'vas 1nade for the last 
time. The very mention of such a principle indicates the 
absurdity of any such duty or obligation. Certainly 
nothing is given in the evidence to support such a con-
tention. A'll of the testitnony, including that of Chris-
tensen himself, is to the effect that no test or exainina-
tion need be made where a chain block is worked only 
to the extent indicated in this case. 
The evidence is clear that a chain block is accepted 
at the manufacturer's rating and is never tested or ex-
amined other than was done· in ·this case to see that it is 
operating properly. The evidence is clear that no rea-
sonable examination would have revealed the defect in 
the lack of annealing of the link. If the weld itself 
was defective, that 'vould not appear until a crack had 
developed. There is np evidence that even after com-
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panies have abused a block and chain, an examination 
is n1ade of the 1nachinery or of the chain, link by link. 
Is this Court to establish as a degree of negligence 
in industry the failure to exa1nine a block and chain after 
it has been used for forty-eight hours on a load w~thin 
its rated capacity1 How could this Court establish such 
a rule when there is no evidence that .industry itself has 
ever required such an examination, or that such a use 
could possibly drunage a chain or require inspection! 
There was nothing about the use of the chain block that 
was ilnprope-r or that the use exceeded a normal one o,f 
equipn1ent of this kind. There 'vas no evidence what-
ever of any standard of care or any necessity of an 
inspection of a chain block after it had been used only 
five or six times for the very purpose for which it. was 
constructed and supplied. There is not e-ven any evi~ 
denc.e to the effect that had any examination been made 
any defect would have been apparent. We submit that 
the court erred in permitting the jury to speculate that 
son1e mythical requirement existed that defendant had 
the duty to make such inspection. The most favorable 
consideration that can be given to Mr. Christensen's tes-
timony is that a "wise precaution" might be to make an 
inspection of the kind he indicates. He does not know 
of such a. standard in the industry. Such an inspection 
might have disclosed a crack that might have developed 
~ince the first use. 
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POINT NO. II. 
ONE SUPPLYING CHATTELS GRATUITOUSLY FOR 
THE USE OF ANOTHER HAS NO DUTY TO DIS-
.COVER LATENrr DEFECTS. 
· In Instruction No. 4 the trial judge instructed the 
Jury: 
"It was the duty of the defendant in this 
case to use reasonable care to determine and 
ascertain whether or not the chain block in ques-
tion was reasonably safe for the plaintiff . . . . 
to use in the performance of the 'vork in question." 
Under the facts and circumstances in this case this 
instruction was clearly erroneous and the giving of it 
'vas reversible error. 
There is no question in the evidence as to the fact 
that the defendant offered the chain block for the use 
of plaintiff and plaintiff's employer- as a gratuity and 
not by reason of any contractual arrangement between 
either defendant and plaintiff or defendant and plaintiff's 
en1ployer .. Defendant permitted the chain block to be 
used as a convenience, a favor, to the Silver Company. 
In fact, it was Mr. Silver himself who made the decision 
tha.t the chain block should be used rather than the hoist 
'vhich had previously been used to lift the transformer. 
The liability in such an instance is discussed in Section 
392 o{ American Law Institute Restatement of the. Law 
of Torts (1-lestatement on 1'orts, Volume 2, Pages 1064-
1068): 
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·~one 'vho supplies to another, directly or 
through a third person, a. chattel to be used for 
the su.ppli.er's business purposes, is subject to 
liability to those for whose use the chattel is 
~upplied or to those 'vho1n he should expect to be 
in the vicinity of it~ probable use for bodily har1n 
caused by the use of the chattel in the manner 
for "\Yhich and by persons for 'vhose use the· chat-
tel is supplied: 
(a) If the supplier has failed to exercise 
reasonable care to 1nake the chattel safe for 
the use for which it is supplied, or 
(b) If the supplier's failure to give those 
whom he should expect to use the chattel the 
inforn1ation required by the rule stated in 
Section 388 is due to his failure to exercise 
reasonable care to discover its dangerous 
character or condition." 
The editors of the Restaten1ent specifically point out that 
the words ''for the supplier's business purposes" do not 
apply if the appliances supplied are furnished as a gra-
tuity and not for the :--upplier's business purposes. (Ibid, • 
p. 1068) 
u • * * it is understood that the person who is 
to do the work is to supply his own instrumen-
talities, but the person for whom the work is to 
he done permits his o'vn tools or appliances· to be-
used as a favor to the person doing the work, the 
tools and appliances are supplied as a gratuity 
and not for use for the supplier's business pur-
poses." 
Illustration No. 3 on pages 1068 and 1069 applies 
to tl1P fact~ and circun1stances in this case: 
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"A, a building contractor, contracts to erect 
a building for B, and erects the necessary scaf-
fold. A en1ploys C, a sub-contractor to do the 
masonry work. C in perfor1ning his 'vork as sub-
contractor uses the scaffold for the business pur-
poses of A and C. The business having been com-
pleted according to the contract, B desires to have 
so1ne additional work done on the exterior and 
e1nploys C by an independent contract between 
B and C. To do this work it is necessarv for the 
use of the scaffold A says to C, 'He~e is the 
scaffold; you may- as well use it.' C's use of the 
scaffold in doing this additional work is not for 
a business purpose of A." 
In the case at bar, the Silver Company was employed 
as an independent contractor to do the electrical repair-
ing work required as indicated in the evidence. The 
Silver Co1npany e1nployed ·a hoist operated by a truck 
to lift the transfor1ner out of the 1netal container both 
during the period of the initial repair and during the 
first lifting of the lengthy remodeling and repair which 
follo,ved. The decision to use the chain block was made 
by ~ir. Silver. The chain block 'vas used as a gratuity as 
far as the defendant \vas concerned, defendant not hav-
ing obligated itself in any manner to furnish this kind of 
equip1nent. According to the Restaten1ent's o'vn inter-
pretation of Section 392, therefore, the ~pecial liability 
there.in prescribed is inapplicable to the facts of this 
case. 'Plaintiff 1nust rely upon the general liability of 
the supplier of a chattel as elsewhere defined. (See Re-
statement 388 and Point I (b) of this brief.) In this 
regard it has been heretofore pointed out that the liabil-
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ity described in Section 388 of the Restatement is abso-
lutely inapplicable to the facts in this case because 
defendant did not kno'v of any facts not in the possession 
of the plaintiff 'vhich caused hlln to believe that the 
chattel "'"as unsafe or dangerous for the intended use. 
Plaintiff cannot bring hiluself under the ru1e stated in 
Restate1nent Section 388 for the reason that the e:vi-
dence clearly established the fact to be that any defect 
in the chain could not be discovered except by a destruc,-
tive test. Such a test 'vould not be reasonable. 
Instruction 3(a) (R. 40) is substantially a word 
for "'"ord recital of the rule stated in Section 392. Since 
it i~ inapplicable to the facts of this case, it is obviously 
rni~leading and plainly reversible error. . 
This argrunent is presented for consideration in the 
event the Court disagrees 'vith the position taken by 
appellant in Point I. In any event, there was no stand-
ard proved here which requires an·y inspection, especially 
in vie'\? of the affirmative custon1 to rely upon man·u-
facturer's rated capacity. 
POINT NO. III. 
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF NEGLIGENCE IN 
PURCHASING FROM THE MANUF ACTURE.R THE 
BLOCK AND CHAIN IN THIS CASE, AND T'IJE 
COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY THEY 
COULD CONSIDER THE PERSON FROM WHOM 
THE CHAIN BLOCK WAS PURCHASED AS NEG-
LIGENT. 
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In Instruction No. 5, the Court enumerated various 
elernents which the jury could take into consideration 
in dete1~1nining whether defendant was negligent. In-
cluded in these elements was, in the Court's words, "The 
circumstances as to \\·hom it (the chain block) ,vas 
bpught from." The only implication pos~ible fron1 this 
instruction was that there was evidence to support the 
proposition that defendant was negligent in purchasing 
the chain from an unreliable con1pany. Not only is there 
no clain1 in the complaint or in any pleading in this action 
that the defendant relied upon this theory of negligence, 
but the record is absolutely barren of any evidence to 
support such a claim if it had been made.. The jury 
could not inf'er fron1 any fact presented to it or any issue 
properly before it that the supplier of the chain block 
to the defendant was not of the most satisfactory repu· 
tation and the highest integrity. To permit the jury to 
speculate that there was son1ething in "the circumstances 
as to whon1 it was bought froin" _and the defendant's 
conduct with reference to those circumstances that per1nit 
an inference of negligence is a clear and reversible error. 
The chain block concerned in this law suit was manu-
factured by McCollou1n Hoist & Chain Company, a 
nationally advertised concern whose products are well 
known in the trade. In fact the product is known in the 
san1e sense in the industry that Yale & Towne, and 
Reading l~ Chisholn1 are known. (R. 301, 302, 350, 351) 
Plaintiff hiinself did not make any allegation in his 
complaint . which placed 1n 1ssue the integrity of the 
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c:ou1pany fro1n "·hich defendant purchased the chain. The 
allegations of negligence in plaintiff's original c~1nplaint 
appear in Paragraph 6. There plaintiff alleges that the 
chain ,,·as constructed by the defendant and that the lack 
of proper construction by the defendant was a cause of 
action con1plained of. (R .. 2) In the an1ended complaint, 
plaintiff stated that the breaking of the link was the 
proxin1ate result of the "negligent construction by the 
defendant or by defendant's agent fron1 who1n defendant 
1nay have obtained said chain block." (A1nended com-
plaint, paragraph 6, R. 25-26) The fact of the matter 
as developed at the trial is as herein stated that the 
defendant obtained the chain block fro1n McColloum 
IIoist &· Chain Con1pany and not any agent of its own. 
rrhe only negligence could be a failure to use reasonable 
care in selecting a chain block of this kind. As to this 
question there is absolutely no evidence except that Mc-
Collounl Con1pany was a nationally known, reputable 
con1pany. 
This 1natter assmites importance in the case at bar 
because of the uncontroverted and undisputed evidence 
that there 'vas an affirn1ative custom in the trade to rely 
upon the ~tated capacity rating of the manufacturer. 
The effect of this custom is discussed elsewhere in this 
brief. The Court's error 'vith reference to the point 
under consideration should be considered in connection 
with tlH~ innuendo~ by plaintiff's counsel to the effect 
that the 1IeCulloum Company was not reliable.. (See, 
for exan1ple, (R. 173.) Certainly the Court should not 
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have undertaken to enlarge the is~ues 'vith reference to 
kinds of negligence at issue in this action, and should 
not have given an instruction 'vhich permi~ted the jury 
to infer. negligence upon the theories not supported by 
any proper evidence or any evidence at all. 
POINT NO. IV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING CHRISTEN-
SEN TO GIVE HIS OPINION . AS TO WHETHER 
THE CHAIN BLOCK SHOULD HAVE BEEN IN-
SPECTED AFTER IT HAD BEEN IN USE FOR A 
PERIOD OF FORTY-EIGHT HOURS. 
The objectionable testimony by Christensen was 
adduced after plaintiff's change of position as indicated 
in Point No. 1 (c). Plaintiff's counsel asked: 
'•Q. Now in your opinion, according to what 
you would consider to be reasonable care under a 
situation ",.here it is holding six tons, where men 
are working in the sarne room, do you have an 
opinion as to whether or not that chain block and 
the links therein should have been inspected super-
ficially? , That is, by looking at thern after this 
period of forty-eight hours hanging about ",.hich 
we have already mentioned 1 
"A. Well-
"MR. BURTON: I object to that as inconl-
petent, imrnaterial and irrelevant and asking for 
an improper conclusion and as one, if anyone 
· should rnake it, should be made by the Court and 
Jury. 
"THE COURT·: The objection is sustained. 
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''Q. In your opinion, ~hould this have been 
inspected after it had been used for a period of 
forty-eight hour~, holding a "'"eight of six tons 1 
"~IR. BURTON: ''T e renew our same objec-
tion. It is the sa1ne question on which Your 
Honor has just 1nade a ruling. 
"THE COuRT: I think it is somewhat 
different. The objection will be overruled. * * * 
h.A.. ''Tell, all I can say on that in view of 
the type of 1nachinery it "~ould certainly have been 
the 1nost 'vise precaution to exan1ine it to deter-
Inine if there 'vas any defect before the final use." 
It is subnritted that the first ruling of the Court on 
tllis question "'"as proper, and that the second ruling was 
clearly erroneous. The function of the jury is to estab.;. 
lish a reasonable standard of care. The testimony of 
Chri~tensen prior to this question was that his opinion 
'vas the erack eould have developed. during the period 
of use and that it 1night have been apparent if the chain 
had been examined prior to the break. There is no way 
to deter1nine, according to Christensen, whether the~ crack 
would have been visible thirty seconds, several hours or 
several days prior to the break. The follow~ng questions 
and ans"~ers are indicative of his frame of mind on the 
~ubject: 
HQ. Now inasn1uch as you have ~o1ne opinion 
on this can you tell n1e at "-hich hour of the forty-
eight this started to separate~ 
"A. Not being God I wouldn't know, no. 
(R. 249) 
lie further stated that he had never tested a chain-
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that he _was a 1netallurgist and that the testing of chains 
a.s. such. was not part of his job. (R. 249) It plainly 
appears, therefore, that the opinion of Mr. Christensen 
as. to. whether. or not an inspection would be reasonable. 
under the circurnstances here has no more validity and 
is no 1nore expert than the opinion of any juror on the 
subject. Ce-rtainly Christensen 'vas not qualified as an 
expert to usurp the function of the jury and· make it a 
deter1nination upon th~ very fact that it was· bound to 
ascertain as the trier of fact. 
No facts were ever presented to the jury to justify 
Christensen's answering a question of this kind. Even 
if. there had been facts to justify a, hypothetical question, 
this one was improperly asked. If the first question had 
been as to whether the witness had an opinion as to 
whether such and such action was reasonable in such 
and such circumstances, he could not have answered in 
the negative without having to admit that such an opin-
io~ was based upon neither his own experience nor the 
·practice of reasonable men in the industry. As the ques-
tion was asked, the requisite safeguards for expert tes-
tiinony were absolutely wanting. 
POINT NO. V. 
THE COURT· .ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE DE-
FENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS 2, 3, 4 
7 AND 9 . 
. The la\Y related to the duty of defendant under the 
circurnstances of this case is discussed in Points T, II and 
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III of this brief. No purpose 'vould be served by reiter-
ating the requested instructions and the applicable law 
at this time. The defendant's requested instructions 2, 
· · · ·· 3, 4, 7, and 9 correctly state the applicable la'v a.nd failure 
to give these instructions 'vas erroneous. 
POINT NO. VI. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE DE-
FENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 1 
FOR A DIRECTED ·vERDICT AND IN FAILING TO 
GRANT DEFENDANT'S 1\IOTION TO DISMISS 
~lADE TO THE COURT AT THE CONCLUSION OF 
PLAINTIFF'S CASE. 
As is discussed in Points I, II and III of this brief, 
plaintiff did not establish a standard of care, the viola-
tion of-"\\'"hich "~as negligence. Nor did plaintiff establish 
any breach of duty which defendant owed to him under 
the circumstances here present. These questions are 
discussed in detail heretofore in this brief and no purpose 
would be served in duplicating a. discussion of Appel-
lant's position at this point. 
POINT NO. VII. , 
THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTRUCTIONS 
NOS. 4 AND 5. 
The error in giving In~tructions Nos. 4 and 5 is 
discussed in Point I of this brief. No purpose would be 
served in duplicating that discussion here. 
However, even assun1ing that there was evidence 
before the jury that the inspection referred to: in the 
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instru~tions and under Point I could have been 1uade or 
sho~ld have been made, the instruction of the court is 
erroneous on the further ground that it is void of any 
criteria . or standards or considerations as to what fac-
tors the jury might consider in determining 'vha.t the 
reasonable standard was. In other words, the jury could 
not ascertain from the instructions what conduct, if it 
believed the evidence 'vas true as to such conduct, it 
could find to be unreasonable under the circun1stances. 
It was left to speculate not only as to what evidence 
would have to be believed, but '\Vhat standard could be 
applied and what would constitute the deviation fron1 
that standard. The primary purpose of instructions to 
the jury is to furnish guide posts in established eri teria 
of negligence. These guide posts are absolutely wanting 
in the instructions by the court in the case at bar. 
For the reasons stated in the Argurnent in Point 
No. I and as herein stated, Instructions Nos. 4 and 5 
are clearly erroneous. 
CONCLUSION 
This court should enter its order setting aside the 
verdict and dis1nissing plaintiff's con1plaint. In any event 
the errors con1mitted require granting defendant a new 
trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
McKAY, BURTON, ~Ic~IILLAN 
& RIC'HARDS, 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Appellant. 
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